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ABSTRACT
Aggregate time series data are used to calculate the incidence of capital taxes. Part of the
analysis is borrowed from the literature on sales tax incidence, comparing pre-tax interest rates with
tax rates. The other part compares tax rates with after-tax interest rates, which are measured
separately and independently from pre-tax interest rates. I find a positive correlation between capital
tax rates and pre-tax interest rates, and little correlation between after-tax interest rates and tax rates,
but both of these findings seem to derive in part from the effect of the business cycle on tax rate
measures, as opposed to a shifting of capital taxes. The empirical findings are consistent with
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I.  Introduction
Who bears the burden of capital income taxes?  This is an important question because capital
income tax rates have increased so much over time, and vary a lot across countries.  The U.S., for
example, introduced federal corporate taxation in 1909, and rates reached as high as 52% during the
1950's (Cummins et al 1994), and now stand at 35%.  Europeans have been cutting their rates – for
example, the 20 percentage point cuts in Germany and Ireland between 1995 and 2001 (American
Council for Capital Formation 2001, citing PricewaterhouseCoopers) – to the point where most
Western European countries have lower rates than does the U.S.  Estimates of capital tax incidence
may also tell us something about the market for capital, and capital’s place in a full model of the
economy.
One approach to calculating tax incidence is to build a general equilibrium model of the
supply and demand for capital, choose numerical values for its parameters, and then simulate pre-
and post-tax interest rates under various policy options.  Harberger’s 1962 paper is a famous
example of this approach.  The approach of my paper is to use measurements of pre- and post-tax
interest rates, and compare their evolution over time to the time pattern of tax rates.  A few previous
studies have used a related approach to study the incidence of excise taxes (eg., Due 1954, Evans
et al 1999 and the papers referenced therein), payroll taxes (Mitrusi and Poterba 2000), and retail
sales taxes (Haig and Shoup 1934, Poterba 1986, Besley and Rosen 1999) – namely to look at
correlations between a price series and tax rates.  Half of my analysis is quite analogous with theirs,
although one difference is that I separately and independently construct measures of pre-tax and
post-tax interest rates, and thereby provide two independent estimates of the incidence of capital
income taxes.
To be more specific, I consider time series regressions of the log pre-tax interest rate r on
the log of the after-tax share:Capital Tax Incidence - 2
ln [rt(1&τt)] ' α % (1 & β)l n( 1 &τt) % gt (2)
where τt is the year t capital tax rate, gt captures other determinants of rental rates, and β is the
fraction of the capital tax passed on, rather than being paid by savers.  Equation (1) has a log-linear
functional form, which is convenient since it is readily decomposed into “anticipated” and
“unanticipated” components and, since the after-tax interest rate is rt(1-τt), it implies that the fraction
of the capital tax paid by capital is (1-β).  Capital bears all of the burden when β = 1 and none of the
burden when β = 0.  The capital tax burden is “over-shifted” when β > 1.
Substituting equation (1) into the definition of the after-tax interest rate, we have equation
(2):
which says that we can also infer β using measures of after-tax returns.  My paper uses consumption
growth and various financial returns to make these inferences.
The empirical approach has the advantage that it does not require a numerical model of the
entire economy, or a struggle with interpreting the results of such a model when it is known to have
some important inconsistencies with observation.  But the empirical approach has the disadvantage
that tax rate fluctuations over time may be a reaction to, or just coincident with, other economic
fluctuations (in terms of equations (1) and (2), τ is correlated with g), so that it is difficult calculate
the counterfactual time series that would have been realized under a different capital tax policy.
Another disadvantage is that it is hard to determine when information about capital tax changes
began to be included in investment decisions.
Section II presents my interest and tax rate data.  Section III looks at medium-term
fluctuations of capital taxes and rental rates.  Section IV displays regressions of various pre-tax and
post-tax interest rate measures on various capital tax rate measures.
II. Measures of Pre- and Post-Tax Returns on Capital
II.A.  Capital Returns as Measured in the National Accounts
One measure of the pre-tax interest rate is capital income net of depreciation per dollar ofCapital Tax Incidence - 3
1Data sources are detail in the Appendix.
2Government net product is equal to the compensation of government employees,
because, as explained by Parker et al (1995, p. 36), the national accounts assume that
government assets (other than those used by government enterprises selling their output in the
marketplace) yield no services in production beyond their depreciation.
3These two steps implicitly assume that capital and labor income accrue in the same
shares in three sectors – the nonproprietary sector, the proprietary sector, and the foreign sector. 
My formula for pre-direct-tax private sector capital income is (NI-Yg-NFI)[1-Wp/(NI-Wg-Ys)],
where Ys is proprietors’ income, NI is national income, NFI is net factor income from abroad, Wp
is the private employee compensation of domestic residents, and Wg is the labor compensation of
domestic government employees.
capital in place at the beginning of the year.  Capital is measured as proportional to the BEA’s
(2000) fixed assets valued at current cost, and is aggregated for private residential and nonresidential
sectors.
1  Note that the capital measured is employed domestically (including foreign-owned capital),
includes owner-occupied housing, excludes consumer durables, and excludes the government sector.
Current cost capital is not the same as book value, because the former aggregates real investment
flows, and the latter aggregates investment expenditure flows.  Capital income is measured
accordingly, in three steps.  First, income accruing to agents with their factors domestically and
privately employed is calculated by subtracting net government product
2 and net factor income from
abroad from national income.  Second, this income is multiplied by one minus labor’s share of non-
proprietors’ private national income, in order to obtain an estimate of the income pre-direct-taxes
going to domestically employed capital.
3  Third, property income tax revenue is added back into
capital income, as suggested by Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983), the result is a capital
rental rate before all taxes, and perhaps the better proxy for the marginal product of capital.  Figure
1 displays this series as a dash-dot line.  The solid line is a calculation of the pre-tax rental rate,
based on the assumption (required in order to have a series prior to 1929) that property taxes are
zero, and is therefore called the “pre-direct-tax” rental rate.Capital Tax Incidence - 4
Figure 1  Capital Rental Rates
II.B.  Financial Returns
Financial asset returns may also be related to capital returns, although it is hard to say for
sure whether, for example, the commercial paper return is tied to the pre-tax, or the post-tax capital
rental rate.  Personal capital income taxes may drive a wedge between consumers’ intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution and the commercial paper return, unless commercial paper were not
held by agents paying personal income taxes.  If a financial asset is held by agents liable for personal
income taxes, then we expect some passing on of the personal capital income tax via a higher return
on that financial asset.
Corporate income taxes should reduce the return on corporate stocks, to the extent that thoseCapital Tax Incidence - 5
4Feldstein and Summers (1978, p. 162) take this approach.
5The estimates in this section were made possible by ongoing research with Justin G.
Marion.  Some of those results are reported in Mulligan and Marion (2000).
taxes are less than fully passed on via a higher capital rental rate.  Stock returns thereby provide a
cross-check on our interpretation of the rental rate - tax rate correlation.  If higher corporate tax rates
are associated with both higher rental rates and higher stock returns, then maybe tax policy tends
to be procyclical, rather than (or in addition to) higher rental rates’ reflecting the passing on of tax
rates.
Because of the debt-equity puzzle, it hard to say for sure how bond returns would be affected
by corporate taxation.  On one hand, if consumers are willingly holding both stocks and bonds, and
personal income tax rules are held constant, higher corporate income taxes should reduce stock and
bond returns by roughly the same amount.
4  One the other hand, if corporations are willingly issuing
both debt and equity, then a high corporate tax rate should increase the return on bonds (whose
interest payments are deductible from the corporate income tax) relative to the return on stocks.
I argue elsewhere (Mulligan 2002) that the consumption-asset-pricing and production-asset-
pricing literature suggest that financial asset returns are noisier measures of the return on capital
(pre- or post-tax) than capital’s rental rate.  This noise may only widen confidence intervals on tax
incidence estimates derived from financial asset returns or, to the extent that departures between
financial asset and capital returns are correlated with capital’s return or with capital tax rates, the
incidence estimates may be biased.
II.C.  Capital Tax Rates
There are many kinds of capital, and many forms of capital taxation.  One approach might
be to explicitly model this complexity, but we
5 follow Griliches and Jorgenson (1966, p. 58),
Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983), Lucas (1990), and Mendoza et al (1994) and attempt
to construct annual measures of the rate τt of taxation of a representative piece of capital’s date t
income.  More specifically, we use the following formula:Capital Tax Incidence - 6
6Lucas (1990) uses a similar method to measure the capital tax rate for 1985 (0.36). 
Mendoza et al (1994) and Lucas (1990) apparently count revenue according to the year it arrives
in the Treasury and therefore in the government budget.  For example, a personal income tax
payment made April 15, 1985 for the 1984 tax year would count as 1984 in my calculations and
as 1985 in the Mendoza et al/Lucas calculations.
7We conjecture that property tax assessors did not adjust the dollar value of their
assessment during the 1930's, when the overall price level and dollar incomes were falling,
which is why aggregate property tax revenue was pretty stable in dollar terms and such a large




Tt / (corporate inc tax revenue)
% (estimated personal capital inc tax revenue)
% (property tax revenue)
(estimated personal capital inc tax revenue) /
(nonlabor inc share of AGI)(total IIT revenue)
where Rt is date t aggregate capital income before direct taxes and after indirect taxes, and Pt is
property tax revenue received by the government in year t.  These are similar to Mendoza et al’s
measures, with four exceptions (i) our definition of capital income is slightly different, (ii) we added
property taxes back into the aggregate capital income (see the denominator, and also Feldstein,
Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba 1983), and (iii) we count tax revenue according to the tax year.
6  On
point (iii), we have used IRS records to measure personal and corporate tax liabilities by tax year.
On point (iv), when we have data on aggregate property tax revenue (1929-), we assume that
property tax liabilities accrue in the year prior to their arrival at the treasury, as indicated in the
formula above.
Figure 2 displays my measure of capital income tax rates, decomposed into the corporate,
personal, and property tax components.  We see how the corporate income tax accounts for most of
the tax rate fluctuations, with the exception of the 1930's when corporate and personal income tax
revenues were few and property tax revenues were substantial relative to capital income.
7Capital Tax Incidence - 7
Figure 2  Capital Income Tax Revenues by Major Type, 1929-97
(as a share of aggregate capital income, before direct and property tax)
Since the changes in the after-tax rental rate that are associated with measured tax changes
are an important ingredient in my analysis, it is worth understanding some of the history of those
tax changes.  The major ones are associated with real, although sometimes passive, changes in
public policy.  For example, the higher levels since 1940 derive from the well known increase in
government revenue’s share of GDP, part of which was financed with the introduction and growth
of corporate and personal income taxation.  The reduction at the end of the war derives from
reductions in corporate and personal income tax rates, and probably in part from legislative
adjustments of nominal tax code to the higher postwar price level.  Federal corporate income tax
rates increased from 38 to 52 percent 1949-52, contributing to the rapid increase in my corporateCapital Tax Incidence - 8
measure during those years.  Federal corporate rates were temporarily increased in 1968 and 1969,
which presumably contributes to Figure 2’s higher measured rate for 1968 and 1969.  Feldstein and
Summers (1979) and Auerbach (1983) explain how high inflation generated higher corporate income
tax revenues in the 1970's relative to the 1980's, and how this increase is indeed a tax on the returns
to investment.  Auerbach (1983, p.455), and Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994, p. 6) explain
how depreciation allowances were liberalized in 1981.  Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard also explain
how the federal corporate income tax’s contribution to the effective tax rate on equipment and
structures increased 1983-87, despite 1986 reductions in the corporate income tax rate, because of
reduced depreciation allowances and investment credits.
II.D. Potential Biases in Measured Tax Rates
There are a number of reasons to expect that the anticipated capital tax rate might be
measured with error, and that those errors would affect incidence estimates.  One important issue
in this regard is whether the rate of capital taxation is anticipated at the time that investment occurs
and consumption is foregone.  The typical legislative calendar is informative in this regard, since
tax laws (ie, schedules relating capital income of various types to tax liabilities) are usually debated
and passed prior to the tax year during which they are in force, we can reasonably suppose that
investors have a good idea of the one-year-ahead relation between capital income and capital income
tax liability.  If capital income taxes were literally proportional, then this would imply that marginal
tax rates are also well anticipated one year ahead.  Marginal corporate and personal income tax rates
are, in the relevant range, fairly constant with income.
Related is the question of whether average and marginal capital income tax rates are the
same.  Again the proportionality of tax rules is relevant.  Also relevant is whether old and new
capital are treated symmetrically.  For example, we could imagine a policy that heavily taxes old
capital, thereby generating substantial revenue (measured as a ratio to the capital stock at the time
of the levy), and the appearance of a high rate of capital taxation, but did not discourage investment
in the year prior to the levy.
These and other departures between the average tax rate (as measured) and the anticipated
marginal rate are sources of measurement error of the tax rate.  If this measurement error were
uncorrelated with the pre-tax rental rate r, then we expect incidence estimates to suffer from the
usual regression bias if those estimates are calculated by a least squares regression of r on theCapital Tax Incidence - 9
8For example, the famous Kennedy tax cuts were said to be designed to stimulate the
economy.  Perhaps similar motives were relevant for the Reagan tax cut.  World War II is an
example where a third factor (the war) led to both economic expansion and higher capital income
tax rates.















measured after-tax share.  If the gap between marginal and average rates were correlated with r, then
the bias could be in any direction depending on the sign and magnitude of the correlation.  It seems
that such departures might be procyclical, and hence positively correlated with r, because tax policy
makers may attempt to “lean against the wind” and otherwise induce average tax rates to be more
procyclical than anticipated marginal rates.
8  If so, the bias in a regression of r on the measured after-
tax share could be downward, rather than upward as with the usual regression bias cited above,
because tax rates are overestimated (underestimated) during booms (recessions).
For example, investment tax credits (ITC) create a difference between average and marginal
rates, and one that we can expect to be positively correlated with rental rates.  One reason is simply
that ITCs have been subtracted from other capital tax liabilities during the computation of capital
tax revenue.  A large ITC during year t relative to year t–1 may discourage year t-1 investment (and
thereby encourage year t-1 consumption) while at the same time reduce average tax rates in year t.
Another bias may derive from the composition of capital income taxes and the differential
cyclicality of their tax bases.
9  Suppose for the sake of illustration that property tax are zero, and that
all capital income falls either under the corporate tax or the personal tax but not both.  Then my






where the R’s are the personal and corporate components of capital income.  The formula above
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fluctuations in my measured tax rate even when the personal and corporate rates are constant.  In





be procyclical even when personal and corporate rates are not.  One way to deal with this bias is to
look at tax rate measures based on statutory provisions rather than measures based on revenues.
II.E. Expected vs. Realized Returns
When modeling the supply and demand for capital, it is the expected return (pre-tax and
post-tax) and the expected rate of taxation that are most interesting, and we will want to calculate
the degree to which expected capital taxation raises expected pre-tax returns rather than lowering
expected after-tax returns.  This degree is potentially different from the degree to which unexpected
capital taxation is associated with an unexpected increase in pre-tax returns.
“Expected” returns and tax rates are calculated using a VAR model, which includes log pre-
tax rental rate, log (1-capital tax rate), nominal paper and bond yields, inflation, stock returns, the
unemployment rate, and consumption growth.  For some of the specifications, bond yields and
inflation are excluded, in order to obtain separate estimates of expected returns pre- and post tax.
II.F. Independent Measures of the After-tax Return
Of course, we could combine the measured tax rates with measured pre-tax returns to obtain
a measure of after-tax returns, but this would not add any new information.  But the Fisherian theory
of savings, as embodied in many modern macroeconomic models, implies that expected
consumption growth is related to the expected after-tax return:
where ct denotes aggregate consumption in year t, σ > 0 is the constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution,  Et-1(@) denotes expectations as of year t-1, and the parameter ρ allows for changes over
time of intertemporal preferences, (nontax) capital market distortions, or specification errors.  So
we can regress expected consumption growth on the capital tax variables, and the coefficient on the
capital tax variables, scaled up by σ, is an estimate of the effect of the tax variables on the after-taxCapital Tax Incidence - 11
return.
III.  Medium-Term Correlations
I begin by dividing the 20
th Century into five-year intervals 1901-05, ..., and for each interval
calculate the average ln rt and the average ln (1-τt).  These are scatter-plotted in Figure 3, with the
war and pre-war data shown as red squares, and the post-war data as black ovals.  In order to have
observations prior to 1929, I assume for the purpose of preparing the graph that property taxes were
zero in every year, and splice the BEA capital stock series with Kendrick’s (1961).  The analysis
below will not require this assumption, and I strongly suspect that the conclusion to be drawn from
the Figure are insensitive to this assumption.
The Figure shows an overall negative relation between rental rates and the after-tax share;
the regression slope is -0.27.  In terms of equation (1), this could be interpreted as a finding that 27%
of the capital tax is passed on in the form of higher rental rates (β=0.27), although closer inspection
of the graph suggests that 0.27 is by no means the best estimate of capital tax incidence.  Namely,
the extreme observations are from the Great Depression and WWII.  It is likely that Depression
rental rates would have been low even if there had been capital taxation.  It is also likely that WWII
separately caused high rental rates and the introduction of capital taxation, rather than one causing
the other.
Prior to the Depression rental rates were quite average by postwar standards, even though
there was hardly any capital taxation.  Hence, comparing the pre-1930 period to the post-war period
suggests that capital bears all of the burden of capital income taxes!  Making comparisons over such
a long time period is dangerous, and the data I have is probably inappropriate for such a comparison,
but hopefully future research can produce improved estimates of rental rates pre-1929.
Table 1 displays some other interest rate measures that permit cross-checking of this
interpretation.  If capital bears all of the burden of the corporate income tax, then consumption
growth and stock returns should be lower post-war with the amount of the reduction commensurate
with the increased rate of capital taxation.  Bond returns may be higher, depending on how we model


























































1996-  Capital Tax Incidence - 12
10Real stock returns may be significantly lower after personal taxes, depending on the
magnitude of the post-war tax we applied to these returns.  Also note that stock return estimates
necessarily have pretty large standard errors.
11The slope is -0.54 if we use the dash-dot series shown in Figure 1, which account for
property taxes.
to savers, because consumption growth and real stock returns have risen slightly.
10  Hence, long term
comparisons with the saver-side data suggest that capital bears none of the burden of the corporate
tax, while the rental rate data suggests that it bears it all!
Table 1: Long Run Trends for the Interest Rate Indicators
1901-29 average 1947-96 average
pre-direct-tax rental 0.088 0.082
consumption growth 0.018 0.020
real stock return 0.078 0.085
real paper return 0.028 0.017
Another approach is to discard the pre 1930 data because of its questionable quality, and add
the unemployment rate as a control for the procyclicality of tax policy.  Doing so yields a coefficient
of -0.69 on ln (1-τt); capital appears to bear about 1/3 of capital income taxes.
Within the postwar period (see the black ovals in Figure 3), we see a significant negative
correlation between rental rates and the after-tax share; the regression slope is -0.53.
11  Hence, our
first impression from the postwar period is that capital bears slightly less than half of the burden of
capital taxes.  Adding the unemployment rate produces a ln (1-τt) coefficient of +0.41.  Consumption
growth and financial return series also suggest that capital bears at least some of the burden, but also
that the procyclicality (across these post-war 5-year intervals) of capital tax policy is limited,
because stock and real paper returns are negatively correlated with the capital tax rate (excluding
the personal tax component).  Interestingly, real paper returns are negatively correlated with the
personal component of capital taxes (even when the other two components are held constant).
Consumption growth is positively correlated with the personal component of capital taxes, andCapital Tax Incidence - 13
12The coefficients for creating the “forecast” use the entire sample period 1947-96.
uncorrelated with the others, which may suggest that capital is not bearing much of the burden, or
that capital taxation tends to be higher in the high return periods.
IV.  Correlations Found in the Annual Time Series
Higher tax wedges should be associated with higher pretax returns and lower after-tax
returns.  Table 2 explores these associations in the annual time series data.  Each column reports
results from a regression of ln (pre-tax capital rental rate) on ln(1-capital tax rate), where the latter
takes on its actual value, its value as forecast from prior year data,
12 or the residual from that
forecast.  Since the after-tax rental rate is (1-capital tax rate) times the pre-tax rental, the regression
coefficient should be negative and its magnitude can be interpreted as the fraction of the capital tax
passed on to labor (ie, β from equation 1).Capital Tax Incidence - 14
Table 2: Pre-tax Rental Rates and Capital Taxes, 1947-96
(dependent variable is log (pre-tax capital rental rate))
specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
independent variables





























2 .14 .22 .21 .48 .47 .18 .15
Notes: (1) A constant term is included in all specifications
(2) Variables used to forecast are the promised (as of the prior year) nominal yield on
commercial paper, the gap between yields on BAA and AAA bonds, and lagged: consumption
growth, stock return, ln (1-capital tax rate), unemployment rate, inflation, and ln(rental rate).
(3) MTR is the Cummins et al marginal corporate tax rate measure.
(4)   Columns (5) and (6) include only the years 1954-89.
The first column displays a coefficient of -0.51.  This suggests that about half of the capital
tax is borne by capital, although we suspect that the coefficient is biased down due to other reasons
for the cyclicality of the tax rate.  For example, it may be that policy-makers anticipate rental rate
fluctuations, and “lean against the wind” by taxing capital heavily when the rental rate is high.
Another possibility is that I mismeasure the tax incentives to accumulate capital so that, for example,
my measured tax rate is more cyclical than the true tax rate.  These two hypotheses can be
distinguished in part by separating the anticipated and unanticipated components of the tax variable.
Column (2) shows a coefficient of -0.65 on the “anticipated” component, and a coefficient on the
unanticipated component that is not statistically different from zero.  Hence, cyclical measurement
biases may not be important, at least if they are present in the unanticipated component.  ColumnCapital Tax Incidence - 15
13MTR and my tax rate measure are correlated 0.92.
14Holding r constant (ie, no shifting), effect of ln(1-τ) on expected consumption growth is
-σr(1-τ).  Mulligan (2002) estimates σ=1 with these data, and r(1-τ) is about 0.08, so the
expected coefficient on ln(1-τ) is 0.08 when there is no shifting.
15The results are similar if my tax rate measure is replaced by Cummins et al’s MTR, and
the sample is restricted to the available years 1954-89.
(3) suggests that column (2)’s result may not derive from cyclical tax policy as captured by the
lagged unemployment rate.  However, columns (4) and (5) suggest that the unemployment rate
forecast predicts the rental rate and, conditional on it, high tax rates are not associated with higher
rental rates.
Columns (6) and (7) tell us something about the effects of deviations of my measured tax rate
from the statutory tax rates.  “MTR” is the marginal tax rate derived from the statutory tax prices
calculated by Cummins et al (1994, Table 1) for manufacturing equipment and structures (and
averaged across asset types weighting by the net stock of those assets).  Column (6) replicates
column (1) for the years 1954-89 when the Cummins et al measure is available, and reports a
coefficient on the tax share term of -0.73.  The coefficient is reduced in magnitude, but is still
significant, when MTR replaces my tax rate measure.
13
Table 3 examines the indicators of after-tax returns.  The first two specifications show that
consumption growth between years t-1 and t is not correlated with capital taxation in year t.  This
might occur because capital does not bear any of the burden of the capital tax, or that capital taxation
in fact reduces consumption growth but that measured capital tax rates happen to respond to other
cyclical variables.  Column (3) checks this by adding the unemployment rate forecast to the
regression, and we see how the forecast predicts consumption growth, and conditional on the
forecast, there may be a positive correlation between the tax share forecast and consumption growth.
The standard error is fairly large, but the 0.08 point estimate is consistent with no shifting.
14  Column
(4) is also consistent with little or no shifting, at least if tax rates were persistent over time in
addition to responding to cyclical variables, because it shows that consumption growth is less after
a period of high personal capital taxation.  Columns (5)-(8) suggest that lagged tax rates may predict
nondurables and services growth somewhat better than they predict nondurables growth.
15Capital Tax Incidence - 16
Table 3: Consumption Growth and Capital Taxes, 1947-96
specification: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
consumption measure:
independent variables
nondurable expenditure only nondurables and service expenditure





































2 -.02 -.03 .07 .00 .00 -.02 .00 .19
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is consumption growth.  A constant term is included in all specifications
(2) Variables used to forecast are the promised (as of the prior year) nominal yield on commercial paper, the gap between yields on
BAA and AAA bonds, and lagged: consumption growth, stock return, ln (1-capital tax rate), unemployment rate, inflation, and
ln(rental rate).Capital Tax Incidence - 17
Table 4's first two columns suggest that commercial paper returns tend to be lower when
capital tax rates are higher, and that this relation derives from the forecastable component of the tax
rate.  One interpretation is that it is part of the absorbing of the capital tax by savers, although in
theory lower bond returns would occur only if the capital taxation was on property or the
corporation, because bond interest is taxable by the personal income tax.  Column (3) suggests that
this interpretation may only be partly correct: higher corporate rates are associated with lower paper
returns, but so are higher personal tax rates.  A fairly similar pattern is seen for stock returns, as
shown in columns (4) and (5).  Higher personal tax rates, and perhaps also higher property tax rates,
are associated with lower stock returns.Capital Tax Incidence - 18
Table 4: Financial Asset Returns and Capital Taxes, 1947-96
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2 .46 .45 .54 -.04 .04
Notes: (1) A constant term is included in all specifications
(2) Variables used to forecast are the promised (as of the prior year) nominal yield on commercial
paper, the gap between yields on BAA and AAA bonds, and lagged: consumption growth, stock
return, ln (1-capital tax rate), unemployment rate, inflation, and ln(rental rate).  Bond yields and
inflation are excluded when the forecasts are to be used in the paper return equation.
V. Summary and Conclusions
A first examination of the time series shows no evidence of overshifting of the capital
income tax.  In other words, the pre-tax rental rate increases by no more than the amount of the
capital income tax. Even if we discard the pre-1930 observations from Figure 3, the regression slope
is still around one, and we suspect that the magnitude of the slope is overstated because of other
sources of capital tax cyclicality (in terms of equation (1), a positive correlation between τ and g).
More research is needed to determine which of the “imperfect competition” models of capital
accumulation and aggregate economic activity are consistent with my findings.Capital Tax Incidence - 19
Some of the longer term comparisons suggest that, although there is no overshifting, capital
bears very little of the burden of capital income taxes.  For example, there was a lot more capital
taxation after World War II than 1900-29, but consumption growth, commercial paper returns, and
stock returns were essentially the same during the two periods.
The annual post-war data show a significant negative correlation between pre-tax rental rates
and, in some specifications, no correlation between consumption growth and tax rates.  These
findings are consistent with a lot of shifting, but they may only be the result the cyclical behavior
of my tax measures.  Controlling for an unemployment rate forecast, capital taxes seem to
significantly reduce consumption growth without significantly raising rental rates.  This suggests
that there is little shifting, or perhaps that there is shifting which creates unemployment.  Overall,
one might characterize the time series as showing little shifting in the “short run” and a lot of
shifting in the “long run,” although more empirical work needs to be done regarding the
measurement of key variables in a consistent way over long time periods, and separating the effect
of the business cycle on capital tax rates from the effect of tax rates on the business cycle.  More
work also needs to be done with comparing these data with models of capital tax incidence.
VI.  Appendix: Data Sources
capital, current cost The current cost net stock of private fixed assets at the end of the previous
year, as reported in BEA’s Table 1.1 “Current Cost Net Stock of Fixed Assets and Consumer
Durable Goods”(1926-99), and Kendrick’s private domestic capital stock (1961, Table A-XV,
1900-25).  The Kendrick series is merged with the BEA series by multiplying the former by 0.771
in order to make the levels of the two series identical in 1925.  “Capital” as referenced in the text
is current cost capital, unless noted otherwise.
capital income Real income to domestically employed private capital, calculated  as
(Y-Yg)[1-Wp/(NI-Wg-Ys)], where Y is real net domestic product, Yg is the real net product of the
government sector, Ys is proprietors’ income, NI is national income, Wp is the private employee
compensation of domestic residents, and Wg is the labor compensation of domestic government
employees.  Capital income after-tax is calculated by subtracting real capital tax revenue (deflated
with the GDP deflator) in the corresponding tax year.
capital rental rate capital income/capital.  The after-tax rental rate is real capital income after-taxCapital Tax Incidence - 20
per dollar of capital.  “Capital” is measured at current cost, unless noted otherwise in the text.
capital tax revenue Federal, state, and local personal capital income, corporate income, property,
excess profit, capital stock, and document & stock transfer tax revenue.  Federal personal income,
corporate income, and excess profits tax revenues are dated by tax year as reported by IRS (various
issues).  State and local revenues are dated by the year in which they arrive in the state treasuries
from U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (1996, 1999).  Personal capital income tax revenue is
calculated as the product of personal income tax revenue and one minus labor’s share of AGI (1916-
99).  Before 1916, the latter is assumed to change proportionally with labor’s share of national
income.
capital tax rate Capital tax revenue/capital income.  see also the formula in the text.
consumption Nominal expenditure from Kenrick (1961, Table A-IIb, 1899-1928) and BEA
NIPA Table 1.01, line 2 (1929-99) plus$2b for alcohol (1929-32, $1.335b for 1933).  Since 1929,
BEA decomposes consumption into expenditures on nondurables, durables, and services.  Real
expenditure per person aged 15+ calculated by dividing by the GDP implicit price deflator and
Population aged 15+.  In order to increase comparability with Hall (1988), I report results in the
body of the paper derived from the nondurables-only consumption measure.  Appendix I explores
alternative specifications.
domestic product Gross from Kendrick (1961, Table A-III, 1900-28) and BEA NIPA Table 1.1,
line 1 (1929-99).  Net from Gross minus  Kendrick’s (1961, Table A-III, 1900-28) National Capital
Consumption Allowances and directly from BEA NIPA Table 1.12, line 1 (1929-99).  Net product
of the government sector from Kendrick (1961, Table A-III, 1900-29) and BEA NIPA Table 1.12,
line 10 (1929-99).  Labor’s share of nonproprietor’s income from Kendrick (1961, Table 28, 1900-
28, missing years linearly interpolated).  Since 1929, employee compensation of domestic residents
from BEA NIPA Table 1.15, line 53 and compensation of government employees from BEA NIPA
Table 1.15, line 44.  Proprietor’s income from BEA NIPA Table 1.15, line 54.
GDP implicit price deflator Kendrick (1961, 1899-1928) and BEA NIPA Table  701,  line  4
(1929-99).
investment price index The ratio of the NIPA investment and consumption deflators, as
reported by BEA NIPA Table 701, lines 8 & 24 (1929-99).
long-term bond yields Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield as reported by Citibase series
FYAAC (1919-99) and spliced with Census Bureau series HS X-490 by adding 50 basis points toCapital Tax Incidence - 21
the latter.  Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield is an annual average of monthly yields reported on
by St. Louis Fed (1919-99).
national income, and components National income from BEA NIPA Table 1.14, line 1 (1929-)
and Census Bureau HS F-7 (-1928).  Employee compensation and proprietors' income with
inventory valuation and capital consumption allowance from BEA NIPA Table 1.14, lines 2 and 9
(1929-).  As shares of national income, employee compensation and proprietors' income are reported
by Johnson (1954, Table 1) at 5 year intervals prior to 1929; I linearly interpolate in between years.
population aged 15+ Calculated as the product of total population and the fraction of the population
that is aged 15+.  Both series are from the Census Bureau (1975, series HS A-29, 1899-1969 and
April 2000 Internet Release, 1970-99), except that the fraction aged 15+ is not always measured
directly, and in these cases interpolated between Census years.
real paper yield For year t, the nominal yield promised in year t-1 on 4-6 month prime
commercial paper, as recorded by the Census Bureau (1975, series HS X-445, 1899-1969) and U.S.
Council of Economic Advisers (1999, Table B-73), minus the GDP deflator log change from t-1 to
t.Capital Tax Incidence - 22
Summary Statistics, 1947-96
variable mean std dev min max
pre-tax capital rental rate 0.095 0.011 0.073 0.121
capital tax rate, total 0.388 0.053 0.279 0.495
capital tax rate, personal portion 0.072 0.009 0.052 0.093
capital tax rate, corporate portion 0.169 0.054 0.096 0.309
capital tax rate, property portion 0.147 0.019 0.112 0.199
nondurable cons. growth 0.007 0.017 -0.035 0.041
nondur & serv. cons. gr. 0.020 0.013 -0.013 0.037
real paper return 0.017 0.031 -0.094 0.087
real stock return 0.085 0.138 -0.279 0.422
nominal paper yield 0.055 0.032 0.008 0.148
unemployment rate 0.057 0.016 0.029 0.097
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